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ABSTRACT
This study investigates whether the apparent intertemporal
instability of a particular reduced-form equation (that for interest rates)
can be explained by changing government policy parameters, or regimes, and
otherwise stable structural parameters. We hypothesize that major fiscal,
monetary, and regulatory policy parameter shifts have been important
sources of that instability. Direct tests imply that reduced-form
coefficients move by statistically significant and economically meaningful
amounts in response to policy parameter change. Allowing for this
systematic parameter variation produces greater stability in the remaining
parameters. Furthermore, in-sample and out—of-sample forecasts from the
proposed model outperform those from the non-responsive parameter
specification.
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(617) 552-3686 (415) 642-3535A. Introduction
For more than a decade, empirical studies have sought to determine whether
nominal interest rates adjust such that real rates are unaffected by changes in
the anticipated inflation rate (the Fisher neutrality hypothesis). An
unsettling aspect of these studies is the volatility of the estimated interest
rate response to anticipated inflation over various sample periods.' Estimates
based on data for the 1950s provided low and insignificant values for the
response.2As the sample period was extended, larger point estimates of the
response were obtained, finally approaching unity. Carlson (1979), Cargill and
Meyer (1980) and Levi and Makin (1979) produce estimated interest rate responses
that decline, often dramatically, when the sample period is extended to include
the first half of the 1970s. Peek and Wilcox (1983) find that the inclusion of
income tax and aggregate supply shock effects reduces, but does not eliminate,
the observed coefficient instability.This suggests other relevant factors
remain.
The Lucas (1976) critique suggests that conventional reduced—form coef-
ficients may vary over time due to the dependence of private sector expec—
tational parameters on government policy parameters.Sims (1982) has recently
countered that this objection should be regarded as no more than a "cautionary
footnote" (p. 108) since policy rules "have not changed frequently or by large
amounts" (p. 138). He argues that in fact there has been little drift in (final
form) parameter estimates through time. Here we test directly whether changes
in policy parameters have produced changes in reduced—form parameters.We
hypothesize that significant, quantifiable changes have occurred in the policy
parameters that are especially relevant to the reduced form for interest rates.
We incorporate these para—meters in our model and investigate whether the
—1—apparent intertemporal instabil—ity of the reduced—form equation for interest
rates can be explained by the changing values of government policy parameters
through time and otherwise stable structural parameters.
We address three major sources of change in the government's policy parame—
t ers :
1) changes in fiscal policy parameters,
2) changes in monetary policy parameters, and
3) changes in financial regulatory policy parameters.
The first category is exemplified by changes in personal tax rates. Peek (1982)
presents evidence that changing tax rates significantly affect interest rates
and that incorporating their movements substantially reduces the instability of
interest rate coefficients.Furthermore, Peek and Wilcox (1984) find that such
tax effects are complete; that is, there is no evidence of the 'fiscal illusion
suggested by Tanzi (1980).The second category of policy parameter change is
typified by the October 1979 change in monetary policy (as well as by the 1951
Treasury Accord). The creation of negotiable certificates of deposit (CDs) in
the early 1960s and of six—month money—market certificates in the late 1970s and
the elimination of interest rate ceilings on large CDs in the early 1970s
exemplify the regulatory changes most directly relevant to financial markets.
By reducing the degree of disintermediation when rates rise, these financial
innovations may have reduced the impact of monetary restraint through credit
availability and thus may have decreased the interest elasticity of private
expenditures. To the extent each of these policies influence structural para-
meters, the reduced—form response of nominal interest rates to anticipated
inflation (and to other factors) will vary with regime changes.
Below we present a simple macro model which highlights the link between
—2—policy parameters and reduced—form coefficients. Sections C and D describe the
estimation and measurement methodology and present our empirical results. The
final section concludes.
B. A Model of Interest Rates
This section presents a model of interest rates that embodies both fiscal
and monetary policy parameters.Solution of the model produces reduced forms
that highlight the link between policy parameter variation and movements in the
reduced—form coefficients. The model consists of IS, LM, wage, aggregate supply,
and monetary policy rule equations. These five relationships can be expressed










where the coefficients of all the variables are assumed to be positive and:
Y =thelogarithm of actual real output,
yNthe logarithm of naturalreal output,
=thepercentage change in real output lagged one period,
X =thelogarithm of the sum of real exports and real
government expenditures,
LIQthe current growth rate of the nominal money supply rela—
tive to its recent growth trend,
—3—M =thelogarithm of the nominal money supply,
=thelogarithm of the non—interest—rate—reactive component
of the real money supply,
P =thelogarithm of the actual price level,
pe =thelogarithm of the expected price level,
W =thelogarithm of the nominal wage,
SS =thesupply shock variable,
a =thestandard deviation of the after—tax nominal interest
rate,
r =thereal interest rate,
=theafter—tax real interest rate,
=theafter—tax nominal interest rate.




where t is the marginal tax rate on interest Income and pe is the anticipated
inflation rate.
Real expenditures depend on the real after—tax interest rate, an investment
accelerator term, exogenous real export and real government demand, and real
shocks emanating from the supply side. In addition, the presence of the
liquidity variable (LIQ) allows us to capture the difference between short—run
and long—run IS curves. This difference follows from the assumed differential
adjustment speeds in real and financial markets. Since real variables (such as
—4—output) adjust more slowly than financial variables (such as interest rates), we
hypothesize a steeper (e.g., vertical) short—run IS curve. The liquidity term
represents accelerations (or decelerations) in nominal money growth relative to
normal. Given an acceleration in nominal money growth, the LM curve would shift
to the right and the economy would move from point A to point B along the ver-
tical short—run IS curve in Figure 1.Movement down the short—run IS curve is
captured by a temporary downward shift of the flatter long—run IS curve to IS'.
Thus, this term allows us to capture the well known liquidity effect.If this
higher growth rate persists, LIQ returns to its long—run value of zero and the
IS curve returns to its original position.
Money demand is hypothesized to depend on output and on the after—tax nomi-
nal interest rate, which represents the opportunity cost of holding money when
interest income is taxed. The third argument in the money demand function (a)
represents a measure of the capital—value risk associated with holding bonds as
alternatives to money in wealth portfolios (see Slovin and Sushka (1983) for
discussion and empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis). The wage and
price equations embody the natural rate hypothesis.
Equation (5) posits a monetary authority (Fed) policy whereby the money
supply rises and falls with the expected price level, natural real output, and
the real interest rate. The Fed almost certainly has reacted to other factors
as well, e.g., cyclical unemployment, inflation, international forces, and the
preferences of individual policymakers.Shifts in the slope parameter ei in
(5), however, can be viewed as capturing some of the major policy shifts of the
postwar period. That parameter measures the extent to which the Fed stabilizes
interest rates in practice, i.e., accommodates. This parameter can be thought









IS' (Long—run)yN) moves in response to fluctuations in the real interest rate. Thereduced
pegging of interest rates after the 1951 Treasury Accord, the increased emphasis
on monetary aggregates in the l970s, and the October 1979 shift to reserves
targeting can each be represented by changes in the policy parameter ei. Since
each of these changes involved moving toward a less procyclical monetary policy
(and a steeper effective LM curve), each can be characterized as a reduction in
e1.
Equations (1—7) can be combined to yield the reduced—form equation for the
nominal interest rate:
=o+ 1pe+ + 3X' + 4LIQ+B5Mx+6SS+7O (8)
(+) (+) (+) (—) (—)(?) (+)




















87 =3 ,and (16)
D
D
(1—t)[a1(b1+d1) + b2] + e1.
(17)
The sign of f is Indeterminate a priori.An adverse supply shock reduces
investment and real wages and thus the interest rate, while at the same time
increasing input costs operating through the aggregate supply equation which
raises the interest rate. The investment—real wage effect might be expected to
dominate, suggesting a negative value for 86. The results presented in Peek and
Wilcox (1983) and Wilcox (1983a, 1983b) support this interpretation.
The three policy parameters t, e1, and ai are of particular interest. To
the extent that any of these parameters (or for that matter, any of the struc-
tural parameters) vary over time, the reduced—form coefficients will also
change.Insofar as the structural parameter in question enters more than one
reduced—form coefficient, the B's will covary deterministically. For example,
the marginal tax rate (t) enters all of the reduced—form coefficients in the
same way. An increase in the tax rate will raise not only the interest rate
response to expected inflation, but also all of the other reduced—form coef-
ficients. A decrease in the response of private expenditures to the real after—
tax interest rate (ai) will reduce the denominators of all eight B's by the same
amount.However, since a1 also appears in the numerator of 81, the interest
rate response to the expected inflation rate will be differentially affected;
the decrease in a1 will raise all of the other reduced—form coefficients, while
the response to expected inflation will be reduced.Similarly, a decrease in
e1 will raise all of the B's except Bi through its effect on D. But, as with
—8--al, ei also enters the numerator of .Inthis instance, however, the direc-
tion of the net effect of the change in e1 on is ambiguous a priori.
C. Methodology
Equations (9)—(17) Illustrate the relationship between policy parameters and
the reduced—form coefficients.Our hypothesis is that failure to allow for
movements over time in these policy parameters has contributed to observed
reduced—form estimate instability.We rectify this shortcoming by including
values of the time series of the proxies for fiscal, monetary, and regulatory
policy parameters.This allows us to test directly for the significance of
policy changes in explaining reduced—form coefficient variability and to eva-
luate whether the remaining, deeper parameters are stable. Incorporating fiscal
policy parameter movements requires a measure of the marginal tax rate of the
marginal investor, t. If a tax—exempt institution is the marginal investor, the
marginal tax rate is zero.If individuals are the marginal investors, the
appropriate tax rate is the marginal personal income tax rate. The progressi—
vity of the personal income tax rates makes measuring that rate problematic. As
our measure of t, we use the average marginal tax rate on interest income
constructed from data contained in annual editions of Statistics of Income,
Individual Income Tax Returns (see Peek (1982)). The tax rate is calculated as
a weighted average of the marginal personal income tax rate for each adjusted
gross income class.The weight for each class is equal to its share of the
total interest received by all income classes.4
A downward drift in the measured interest rate response to expected infla-
tion as the sample period was extended into the 1970s has been noted by Carison
(1979), Cargill and Meyer (1980), and Levi and Makin (1979). This may be due to
the continuing financial institution deregulation and consequent reduction In
—9—disintermediation.A number of regulatory changes reduced the potential for
disintermediation throughout that period (e.g. ,thecreation of negotiable cer-
tificates of deposit, increases in Regulation Q ceilings, the introduction of
six—month money market certificates).Such changes might reduce the interest
response of private expenditures (a1), thereby lowering the reduced—form coef—
5
ficient on expected inflation (see equation (10)).
We allow for changing regulatory policy (and innovation) with a measure of
the effect of such changes rather than attempting to quantify the changes them-
selves. To do so, we take as our regulatory policy indicator, s, the share of
commercial banks' and thrift institutions' liabilities that pay market—related
interest rates. We assume that the interest response of expenditures is a func-
tion of s and DCC:
a1 =f+(f1+f2/s)DCC, (18)
where DCC is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when the three—month
Treasury bill yield exceeds the regulation Q ceiling interest rate on savings
deposits and is zero otherwise. Thus, DCC switches on when disintermediation is
likely. The extent to which a1 changes then depends upon the share of liabili-
ties subject to disintermediation. We also allow the IS curve intercept (a) to




In this specification, f(>0) represents the (absolute value of the) interest
response of expenditures in the non—disintermediation periods.During the
disintermediatlon periods, the value of a1 will increase.Thus, we expect
—10—(f1 + tobe positive.Furthermore, we expect the increase in a1 to be
larger the smaller is the value of s (f2 > 0). We also expect f4 to be positive
in (19).
Similarly, we seek a measure of the time series for the money supply policy
parameter, e1. We obtain an estimate of this series from the following
regression estimated with semi—annual data over our full 1952:06—1983:06 sample
(t—statistics in parentheses):
MDeN =—1.O82m1—1.O86AFB—1.I2IGWM—1.149PV+0.35WMMRE
(14.7) (13.5) (11.8) (12.1) (0.99)
+1.38AFBRE+1.12GWMRE—0.O12PVRE—0.044D8006—0.016T+0.90u (20)
(2.66) (1.33) (0.04) (2.08) (10.8)(16.11
S.E.E. =0.017 D.W. =1.17
WMM, AFB, GWM, and PV are dummy variables that take a value of one during the
terms of the sample's Fed Chairmen Martin, Burns, Miller, and Voicker, respec-
tively. The same variables with the suffix RE are those dummies multiplied by
the expected real interest rate, —,eD8006 is a dummy variable that takes
the value one during the credit control period in 1980. A linear time trend is
included to pick up the long—term increase in velocity. The last term in (20)
indicates a first—order autocorrelation correction coefficient estimate of 0.90.
This specification allows e1 ,thereaction of the money supply to expected
real interest rates, to vary across the regimes of the different Fed chairmen,
but restricts it to be constant within regimes. The four intercept dummies are
included to lessen the likelihood that variations in the overall stringency of
monetary policy across regimes be mistakenly attributed to variations in the
systematic—response coefficient, i.e., to avoid empirically confusing intercept
and slope shifts in the money supply function.The estimated time series for
—11—the money supply reaction coefficient can be read directly from (20).The
values for e1 are 0.35, 1.38, 1.12, and —0.012 for 1952:06—1970:06,
1970:12—1978:06, 1978:12—1979:06, and 1979:12—1983:06, respectively. This
series suggests that the Voicker regime has accommodated real rate shocks least
while the Burns and Miller years saw the most accommodation.The William
McChesney Martin regime appears to have been in between. F—tests allow us to
reject the hypothesis that the money supply reaction coefficient,e1, was the
same across Fed chairmen.6 M is also based on (20). M is minus the
estimated trend, credIt control and real—rate—reactIon elements. Movements in
the intercept dummies plus the error term, u, imply that monetary policy
loosened from the latter 1950s until the early 1970s and has been tighter than
average since the tnld—1970s, especially during the Voicker years.
D. Empirical Results
1. Estimates Based on Constant Policy Parameters
This section presents the results of estimating (8) subject to (9)—(19).
When e1, f1, f2, and f4 are taken to be zero through time,constant—coefficient,
ordinary least squares (OLS) suffices.These restrictions are equivalent to
setting M to equal (M_pe_YN), e1 equal to zero, anda1 equal to a constant. As
a result, (8) can be expressed as:
i =+ 61e+ + 3X'+ LIQ +5M' + $6S5+ (21)





—12—Tanzi (1980) suggests that individuals have suffered from "fiscal illusion"
by falling to take complete account of tax rates.Peek (1982), using a
1960—1979 sample, can be interpreted as testing the hypothesis that individuals
rather than tax—exempt institutions are the marginal investors in the six—month
and one—year Treasury bill market. Alternatively, the null hypothesis could be
that individuals are the marginal investors but ignore income tax considerations
In making their financial decisions. Using the Davidson—McKinnon (1981) non—
nested model specification test, the non—tax adjusted model (equivalent to our
equations (21)—(23) with t =0)was rejected in favor of the tax—adjusted for-
mulation (equations (21)—(23)) using an index of marginal personal income tax
rates. Employing a more detailed model incorporating supply shock and foreign—
held bond effects, Peek and Wilcox (1983) reconfirmed these results for the
entire 1952—79 period for the one—year Treasury bill rate. We also showed how
changes over time in the correlations between the anticipated inflation rate and
the tax rate and supply shock variable contributed to previously measured inter—
temporal instability in the estimated expected inflation coefficients. Further,
Peek and Wilcox (1984) estimate a specification similar to (21)—(23) with (1—t)
replaced by (1—Ot), where 8 reflects the degree of (lack of) fiscal illusion.
Using nonlinear least squares, the estimate of 8 closely approximates one, indi-
cating no fiscal Illusion.Therefore, we here restrict 8 to unity, implying
complete adjustment to changes in tax rate policies. From (23), it can be seen
that (1—t) can be factored Out of the coefficient of each explanatory variable.
Using our tax rate series, we can express (21) with constant reduced—form coef-
ficients when we divide each of the right—hand—side variables by (1—t).The
implied reduced—form coefficients at any time are then the estimated constant
coefficients times the value of (1—t) for that period.
—13—Table 1 presents the results of estimating (21). June and December averages
of the secondary market yield (on a bond equivalent basis) on one—year U.S.
Treasury bills are used as the dependent variable. e is the Livingston one—
year expected inflation rate, recorded in June and December. This measure of
expected inflation has the advantages of being truly ex ante and of embodying
whatever sophistication agents actually use to form their expectations.7The
remaining variables are measured with second and fourth quarter data (except a).
Ml is the nominal money supply. e is the price level expected six months ahead
from the Livingston survey data. N, natural real output, is from the Council
of Economic Advisors.(M_Pe_YN) has been detrended by regressing its log ona
linear time trend and using the residual as M'. LIQ is the difference between
the annualized growth rate of Ml measured from the current to the previous
quarter and its four—quarter growth rate up to that previous quarter. X' is the
logarithm of the ratio of real government expenditures plus real exports to real
natural output. LY is the four—quarter growth rate of real CNP up to the pre-
ceding quarter.SS is the ratio of the import deflator to the CNP deflator,
adjusted for exchange rate changes. a is the 18—month moving standard deviation
of the after—tax nominal interest rate, lagged one month.D7983 is a dummy
variable that takes the value one starting with the December 1979 observation.
The June 1980 observation has been omitted due to the presence of credit
controls; otherwise, the full sample is 1952:06—1983:06.
The estimates in row 1 imply that rises in expected inflation, exogenous
spending, faster real growth, and more volatile interest rates raise rates while
accelerations in money growth, higher real balances, and positive supply shocks
each lower them.After 1979 interest rates were both surprisingly high and









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 the standard error of the estimate rises by 69percent and the measure of
interest rate variability gains in significance.This appears to confirm the
popular attribution of the high post—1979 interest rates to sharply increased
interest rate volatility. Including D7983 in row 3, however, reduces theeffect
of volatility to insignificance. The coefficient of 4.21on D7983 in row 3 indi-
cates that the surprises were large and primarily on the upside.However, even
allowing for this nonexplained upward shift leaves the standarderror of the
estimate much larger than before 1979.
Adding the post—1979 period seems to change the estimated coefficients rela-
tively little. When a time series of the expected inflation coefficient esti-
mate is generated by rolling over a fourteen—year (n=28)sample using the
specification of rows 1 and 2, however, a different pictureemerges. Figure 2
plots this series.Although these coefficients abstract from changes due to
changes in tax rates, they still exhibit considerable movement. Inparticular,
the sharp jump in the series after the 1952 and 1953 observationsare eliminated
and the early 1970s observations are added to the rollingsample, the downward
drift as the sample leaves the 1950s and enters the 1970s, therise as the
sample moves into the second half of the 1970s, and theresumption of the
decline as the 1980s observations are included,suggests that major movements
are left to be explained.
2. Estimates based on Changing Policy Parameters
To estimate (8), allowing for variations inmonetary and regulatory policy
as well as tax policy changes, we substitute (18) and (19) fora1 and a. Later
we wish to calculate the marginal significance levels of eachexplanatory
variable.We require an estimate of the numerator of to obtain a marginal





































































































































































































































































































 that numerator is estimated, we choose to normalize the parameter estimates by


























where the h's and g's are constants.
Allowing a in (19) to change over time requires that we add DCC as an
explanatory variable; its reduced—form coefficient is 88.The coefficient
g9 applies to D7983 (notdivided by D). Our model predicts that h, h2, h3, and
h4 are all positive. The sign of h1 may be positive or negative.We anticipate
positive values for g2, g3, g7 and g8, and negative values for g4, g5, and g6.
The estimates for the 1952:06—1983:06 sample, omitting D7983, are:
i =(1+NPe+0.367Y+1.36X'—0.024L1Q—2.78M—1.22SS+O.llScl+0.68ODCC)/D
(0.26) (1.85) (1.85) (2.08f (3.76) (1.29) (3.57)
(35)
N =0.114—0.O5ODCC+0.OO22IDCC/s+0.245e (36)
(1.34). (0.48) (2.99) (4.99)
1
—18—D(1—t)(0.310 —0.O5ODCC+0.OO221DCC/s)+0.245e (37)
(3.11) (0.48) (2.99) (4.99)
1
where the numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates can be
interpreted approximately as t—statistics.They are calculated as the square
root of the chi—square test statistic used to perform the likelihood ratio tests
of the restriction that each of the relevant coefficients was zero.8The
general pattern of signs and significance of the coefficients in (35) mirrors
the OLS results of Table 1.The coefficients of particular concern here,
however, are those associated with the regulatory and monetary policy para-
meters, s and e1.
The estimates of their coefficients are both positive and decisively signi-
ficant, indicating that the reduced form coefficients do in fact respond to
regime changes.As e1 falls, i.e., as monetary policy becomes less accoin—
modative of real rate shocks, D falls.The response of interest rates to
changes in the explanatory variables (except possibly for e) then rises, as the
economy is effectively operating with a steeper LM curve. As s rises, i.e., as
the share of liabilities which are unregulated rises, D falls, increasing all of
the reduced—form coefficients except that on e Due to the effect of s on the
numerator of ,theincrease in s (reduction in a1) will reduce the reduced—
form expected inflation coefficient. As fewer liabilities are regulated, market
interest rate increases induce less disintermediation and less credit rationing.
Less expenditure is deterred by given interest rate increases, generating an
effectively steeper IS curve, as hypothesized.
Adding D7983 to this specification (not shown) permits us to test whether
the reduced—form coefficient movement that we ascribe to policy shifts remains
when a dummy variable for the later part of the sample is included. The coef—
—19—ficient estimate of 2.87 (t—statistic =2.67)on D7983 does indicate that our
model still leaves an important part of the recent interest rate story to be
told. Our expanded specification has reduced the post—1979 dummy coefficient by
one—third, however, and the coefficients associated with e1 and s retain their
significance.
The summary statistics listed in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that allowing for
changing policy parameters improves the interest rate model. The standard error
of the estimate falls 24 and 30 percent for the short and long samples, respec—
tvely, when we incorporate policy—induced parameter movement. Likelihood ratio
tests more formally confirm the improvement.The specification that jointly
restricts the a and a parameters to be constant and e to be zero in favor of
0 1 1
the expanded model that posits their movement according to (18)—(20) is rejected
at the 5 percent level. This is true for the shorter sample (1952:06—1979:06)
as well as for the sample that includes the post—1979 period, either with or
without the D7983 dummy. For the longer period, the data also decisively reject
the hypotheses that the coefficients associated with monetary policy and regula—
tory policy individually were zero.Further, the expanded model is statisti-
cally superior in—sample to the model that includes D7983 but ignores regulatory
and monetary policy changes. Thus, in addition to producing reduced—form coef-
ficients that move as our theory hypothesizes, allowing for structural change in
response to policy change produces a significantly improved specification.
Figure 3 plots the estimated time series values for ,thereduced—form
coefficient for expected inflation implied by (36) and (37). The implied coef-
ficient exhibits a slight downward drift until the mid—1960s, due to a small
decline in the effective tax rate series. Tax schedule reductions in 1954 and




Estimates of Equation (8)
Sample Period R2 DW SEE SSR
1. 1952:06—1979:06 .9543 1.97 0.545 12.78
2. 1952:06—1983:06 .9502 2.05 0.842 35.43
(without D7983)















































































































































































 early 1960s combined to reduce effective tax rates. After 1965, strong nominal
income growth lifted the effective tax rate and, hence, 8. rose sharply in
1970 with the higher e1 of the Burns regime. The large fall—off in in 1979
Is associated with the dramatic decline in e1 attributed to the Voicker regime.
The sharp upward spikes in reflect the disintermediation effects.During
potential disinterinediation periods (when DCC takes on a nonzero value), the
interest sensitivity of expenditures (a1) and rise. The magnitude of these
increases is related to the share of financial institutions' liabilities that
pay market—related interest rates (s).As s increased over time, the size of
the spikes diminished. After the removal of interest ceilings on large CDs in
the early 1970s, the spikes become almost indistinguishable.
Though the two series are not directly comparable, the pattern in Figure 3
broadly mirrors the rolling sample estimates in Figure 2 (with the exception of
Figure 2's mid—sample spike). The implied time series of the other reduced—form
coefficients are proportional to (lID).Given the form of the model and the
particular set of coefficient estimates, changes in a1 and e1 produce values for
these remaining reduced—form coefficients that move inversely to Figure 3
then shows movements in and the mirror image of the movements of the other
reduced—form coefficients. Changes in t move all coefficients proportionately.
Ignoring regime changes may have been responsible for spuriously unstable
estimates over this period. Our model explains not only statistically signifi-
cant movement of structural, and thus reduced—form, coefficients, but economi-
cally meaningful changes in those parameters. Stability tests conducted over a
mid—sample split using the constant policy parameter specification indicate that
specification Is unstable. By contrast, when we allow reduced—form parameters
to respond to regime changes, the resulting specification Is stable.8
—23—Table 3 lists the actual values of interest rates and the values predicted
out—of—sample by row 1 and in—sample by rows 2 and 3 from Table 1 (constant
policy parameters) and Table 2 (variable policy parameters). The 1980:06 credit
control observation is omitted. The summary measures in Table 3 show that, out—
of—sample or in, the Table 2 equations outperform those from Table 1 over the
most recent period.9 The relative improvement appears to be approximately the
same for either in— or out—of—sample forecasts. In the out—of—sample case, the
mean error is reduced by (4.33—3.01=) 132 basis points (or 30 percent) and the
mean square error by 45 percent.
Fama and Gibbons (forthcoming) suggest that interest rate—based forecasts
may be better predictors of inflation than survey—based forecasts. To investi-
gate the robustness of our findings, we have substituted a measure of expected
Inflation based on prior interest rates for the Livingston survey measure. We
generate these forecasts using only Information publicly available when the
interest rate was determined each period. The forecast during June depends on
the six, monthly—average Treasury bill yields from December to May and on the
forecast equation coefficients.The coefficients are obtained by regressing
inflation on a constant and six lags of one—month Treasury yields over the
forty—eight months ending two months before the forecast is made. Using coef-
ficient estimates from a sample that edged closer to the forecast dates (June
and December) would require more information than agents actually had. Using
these expected inflation proxies, likelihood ratio tests of the hypotheses that
the coefficients on the regulatory regime measures and the coefficient on the
monetary regime proxy are zero are rejected for both the pre—1979 and the longer
sample period.Thus our finding that the reduced—form coefficients respond
systematically to government policy parameter shifts is further substantiated.
—24—TABLE 3
A Comparison of Nominal Interest Rate Predictions from the
Constant and the Variable Policy Parameter Models
Constant Policy Parameters Variable Policy Parameters
in— in-
sample sample
out—of in— with out—of in— with
Date Actual samplesample D7983 samplesample D7983
1979:12 12.26 12.02 13.50 15.56 12.72 14.21 14.70
1980:12 15.25 11.20 14.90 15.26 12.14 14.59 14.71
1981:06 15.23 9.34 13.54 13.63 10.52 13.21 13.29
1981:12 13.08 9.87 14.04 13.89 11.35 14.74 14.42
1982:06 14.38 7.27 9.43 11.46 8.42 12.26 12.19
1982:12 8.97 4.22 8.19 9.30 5.93 9.78 9.84
1983:06 9.73 4.66 8.10 9.79 6.76 9.61 9.76
MEAN ERROR 4.33 1.03 3.01 0.07
MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR 4.33 1.66 1.29 3.14 1.34 1.34
MEAN SQUARE ERROR 22.89 4.74 3.24 12.67 2.33 2.49
—25—E. Concluding Remarks
There is considerable intertemporal instability in previous interest rate
equation estimates. We hypothesize that major fiscal, monetary, and regulatory
policy parameter shifts have been important sources of that instability.We
embed estimates of the time series values of these policy parameters in our
model and estimate the deeper, more stable, underlying parameters. The estima-
tes generate reduced—form coefficients that move by sizeable amounts in response
to policy parameter change.Statistical tests imply that allowing for varying
policy parameters provides a significantly better explanation of interest rates.
These explainable movements in the reduced—form coefficients correspond rather
closely to the heretofore unexplained movements in the rolling sample estimates
obtained from the constant policy parameter model.The variable policy para-
meter model passes the test of stability that the model which ignores regime
switches cannot.Furthermore, in—sample and out—of—sample forecasts from the
proposed model outperform the more traditional specification.
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—29—FOOTNOTE S
1. See, for example, Cargill (1976), Wachtel (1977), Carlson (1979)).
2. See, for example, Cargill and Meyer (1974)).
3. This agenda ignores technological changes such as improvements in infor—
ination processing and data transmission.Though the "deep parameters of
taste and technology may vary over time, their shifts are less readily
quantified and are outside the range of this study.
4. This tax series serves as an index of the marginal tax rate of themarginal
individual, moving with that rate but perhaps not measuring Its level
exactly.
5. Gordon (1984) discusses this effect.
6. Test statistics were calculated from the residuals obtained by ordinary
least squares from the levels and from the first differences of (20). An
alternative we have not pursued is that regime switches occur with changes
In presidents rather than with Fed chairmen. The most discussedmonetary
policy regime switch clearly seems to be associated with the installation of
Paul Voicker as Fed chairman in the middle of the Carter presidency.
7. In Peek and Wilcox (1984), we found that substituting an expected inflation
measure based on prior interest rates did not affect our qualitative
findings.
8. The chi—square test statistics and critical values for the constantpolicy
parameter model are 23.9 and 15.5. For the variable parameter model they
are 17.6 and 21.0.
—30—9. The sample size is 62. The square root of the critical values for the chi—
square distribution and (the absolute value of) the critical values for the
t distribution converge as the sample size grows. These likelihood ratio
tests reject the insignificance of the individual coefficients in (35)—(37)
when the calculated chi—square test statistics exceed 3.84 or, equivalently,
whenthestatistics inparentheses in (35)—(37)exceed 1.96.
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